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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES .AND COMMENTS
CONCLUSION

An accusatory statement is, by its nature,
highly prejudicial to the defendant. A jury is
likely to give it grealer weight than its prolative value warrants In addition, a jury may
consider the statement for the truth of its
contents. It is difficult for a jury to make the
technical distinction between the consideration
of an accusation only for the purpose of giving
meaning to the defendant's reply, and consideration of an accusation itself for the truth
of the matter stated. For this reason, a judge

should exclude this evidence unless he is convinced of the existence of conditions under
which the. defendant can reasonably be expected to deny a statement.4 In addition, if
this type of evidence is admitted, the jury
should be instructed that the probative value
of this evidence is not great, and that the
evidence should be 'considered with caution.4
EvmENcE rule 509 (1942).
e.g., Albano v. State, 80 So.2d 342 (Fla.

45 MODEL CODE oF
46See,

1956).

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Proof of Prior Convictions Admissible as
Part of Prosecution's Case in Chief When
Clear that Defense of Entrapment Will be
Raised-The defendant, a narcotics addict,
was approached by another addict who asked
his assistance in securing drugs. After several
such requests the defendant agreed and several
transfers were made. Thereafter the addict,
who was awaiting sentence on a narcotics
charge and who had in the past co-operated
with the federal narcotics bureau, informed
federal agents of his dealings with the defendant. The latter was then arrested and
charged with the unlawful sale of narcotics.
At the trial in a federal district court, the
defense counsel, in his opening statement,
argued that the defendant had been entrapped.
Thereafter the prosecution sought to introduce
in evidence as part of its case in chief proof of
the defendant's prior convictions as a narcotics
addict. The trial court overruled the defendant's
objections and admitted the evidence. At the
conclusion of the prosecution's case the defense
elected to go to the jury without introducing
evidence. On appeal from his conviction, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, holding that, when it is clear
from the circumstances of the case that the
defendant will raise the defense of entrapment, the prosecution may introduce proof
of the defendant's prior convictions as part of
its case in chief. United States :'. Sherman,
240 F.2d 949 (2nd Cir. 1957'. ,erI. granted,
:97.
., r
T. WEEc 3305 'T-...;..

The court easily disposed of the defendant's
argument that evidence of prior convictions is
only admissible if the defendant first testifies
in his own behalf or introduces evidence of his
good character. The court said that in prior
decisions it had expressly adopted the rule
that such evidence is admissible to rebut
the defense of entrapment. The defendant
aruged, however, that those decisions were not
applicable since they involved the admission
of proof of prior convictions in rebuttal to the
defense of entrapment, whereas in the present
case the evidence was introduced as part of the
prosecution's case in chief. The court rejected
this notion, maintaining that "making the
admissibility of such evidence always depend
upon whether the defendant had introduced
evidence would emasculate the rule and work
grave prejudice to the government in cases
where defendant, as here, elected to go to the
jury on the proofs adduced by the prosecution
in its case in chief." But the court refused to
declare a general rule that this evidence is
always admissible as part of the prosecution's
case in chief whenever there is a possibility
that the defense of entrapment will be raised
and limited its holding to the case where it is
clear that the defense will be raised. In the
present case, it was said, defense counsel,
in his opening statement, indicated his intention to rely on that defense.
Invocation of Privilege Against Self-Incrimi.
nation at Civil Hearing Held Admissible at
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Later Criminal Trial-Prior to his arrest on a
charge of larceny, the defendant had attended a
judicial hearing held to determine the ownership of the property for the theft of which he
was later arrested. At this hearing the defendant appeared as a claimant and voluntarily
testified. However, on advice of counsel, the
defendant invoked his privilege against selfincrimination and refused to answer certain
questions relating to the disputed property.
At his subsequent trial for the theft of the
property, the prosecution introduced in evidence, as part of its case in chief, testimony
that the defendant, at the earlier civil hearing,
had refused to answer questions relating to
the stolen property on the grounds that they
might incriminate him. On appeal from the
defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of
Arizona approved the admission of the evidence.
State v. Marvin, 307 P.2d 607 (Ariz. 1957).
While the prosecution argued that invoking
the privilege is a tacit admission of guilt, the
defendant maintained that the privilege would
become worthless if he were penalized for invoking it. The court noted that, in addition
to the privilege contained in the state constitution, a state statute provides that the
invocation of the privilege may not be used
against the defendant "on the trial or proceedings." The court interpreted the scope of
this statute, however, as limited to the trial at
which the privilege is invoked. While most
courts, it was said, permit a prior claim of the
privilege to be revealed upon the cross-examination of the defendant, there is some indication that a prior refusal to testify is inadmissable unless the accused voluntarily takes
the witness stand. However, the court held
that where the accused voluntarily appears at
the prior civil hearing, his refusal-to testify is
admissible at a subsequent criminal action as
part of the prosecution's case in chief.
A concurring opinion expressed disapproval
of the "whitling away" of the privilege by
the majority opinion. A prior refusal to testify,
it was said, should not be admissible unless the
defendant voluntarily testifies at the subsequent
trial. It was said, however, that sufficient other
ev'ence vz
w .:--,..t-,--, iustain the conviction.
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Waiver of Preliminary Hearing Constitutes
Waiver of Defects in Arrest Warrant-A
federal narcotics agent obtained a warrant for
the arrest of the defendant on a charge of
unlawfully receiving narcotics. During the
following day the officer observed the defendant several times but did not arrest him
until that evening when he emerged, carrying a
package, from the home of a friend. The officers
informed the defendant that they were arresting him under authority of the warrant obtained a day earlier. The package was found by
the officers to contain narcotics, the possession
of which was admitted by the defendant. He
was then arraigned before a commissioner.
At the commitment hearing, the defendant,
who was represented by counsel, waived his
right to a preliminary examination. Thereafter, the defendant was indicted for the unlawful possession of the narcotics in the package
seized by the officers. This was not the crime
for which the arrest warrant was issued. Before
the trial, the defendant made a motion to
suppress evidence of the narcotics found in his
package on the grounds that the seizure was
made without a search warrant and that it was
not permissible as incident to a lawful arrest
because the arrest either was not made under
authority of the warrant possessed by the
officer or, in the alternative, the warrant was
void because it neither contained a statement
of the essential facts, nor were its allegations
based upon the personal knowledge of the
officer who obtained it.- In addition, the defendant maintained, the delay between the
issuance and execution of the warrant rendered
it ineffective. The trial court denied the motion
and the defendant was convicted. On appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, with one member dissenting,
affirmed, holding that the waiver of a preliminary examination constitutes a waiver of the
right to object to defects in the arrest warrant.
Giordenello v. United States, 241 F.2d 575
(5th Cir. 1957).
A preliminary examination, the court said,
would have afforded the defendant "full opportunity to test out the sufficiency of the
complaint and the legality of the wdrrant and
the legality of his arrest under it or the presence
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of probable cause if arrested without a valid
warrant." The defendant's objections, the
court said, are all subject to wviver. Since
they should have been raised at the preliminary
examination, the court hela, waiver -. this
hearing constitutes a waiver of u., right to
object to the al:.ged defects m the arrest.
The dissent agreed with the majority that
waiver of a preliminary hearing constitutes a
waiver of the right to object to "informalities
or irregularities in the warrant or in the complaint." However, the dissent argued that
waiver of the hearing should not constitute a
waiver of the right to object to the fact that
the arrest warrant did not state the facts of the
crime charged but related to another, separate
alleged offense. If there were sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, the dissent
said, demanding a preliminary hearing to
inquire into the legality of the arrest would be
futile, since, even if the arrest were illegal,
re-arrest could follow the hearing. "No lawyer
would dream," the dissent concluded, "that by
failing to demand an apparently unnecessary
preliminary hearing he had waived the right of
his client to object to the legality of his original
arrest and the search that followed."
Numbers Game Is not a Crime Involving
Moral Turpitude-The defendant was indicted
on a charged of aiding in the operation of a
gambling establishment. At the trial a defense
witness was asked, on cross-examination by the
prosecution, whether he had recently been convicted of operating a type 6f lottery known
as a "numbers game." The trial court ovcrrfled
the defendant's objection to the question and
admitted the answer for the purpose of impeaching the witness. On appeal from the
defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia held that conducting a
numbers game is not a misdemeanor involving
moral turpitude and hence is not admissible for
impeachement purposes. The court affirmed the
defendant's conviction, however, on the grounds
that the error was not prejudicial. Parr v.
Commonwealth, 96 S.E.2d 160 (Va. 1957).
The court adhered to the view that proof of
conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude is admissible to impeach a witness.

But the court noted that authorities disagreed
as to the definition of such a crime. While some
courts, it was said, have held the proper test to
be whether the crime is maium in se rather than
malum prohibitum, there is general agreement
that a crime involving moral turpitude is
"an act of depravity in the duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general."
Conducting a lottery, it was said, was not an
offense at common law unless conducted in such
manner as to be a public nuisance. Furthermore, the court noted, while lotteries are prohibited by statute in this state, in some states
they are licensed and permitted to operate.
For these reasons, the court concluded, "while
the conduct of a 'numbers game'. is contrary
to the public policy of this state and our standard of morals, it is not per se immoral or inherently evil and does not involve moral
turpitude."
Failure to Afford Indigent Appellant Assistance of Counsel Violates Due ProcessWhile serving a term in a state prison, the
appellant sought to appeal from his conviction
for grand larceny. Alleging that he was without
funds to employ counsel or to pay for a transcript of the trial court record and that he was
physically unable to inspect the trial record,
the defendant requested that the New York
Supreme Court appoint him counsel to assist
his appeal. Upon thi denial of his request the
defendant appealed to the New York Court of
Appeals. That court, in a per curiam opinion,
reversed the denial of his request, holding that,
under the circumstances of this case, the refusal
to furnish counsel without charge denied the
appellant due process and equal protection
guaranteed by the state constitution. The
court refused to hold, however, that every
indigent appellant is entitled to the assistance
of counsel, and expressly limited its holding to
the facts of the case. People v. Kalan, 140
N.E.2d 357 (N.Y. 1957).
Publicity Attendant Upon Civil Suit Held to
Deprive Defendant of a Fair Trial in Criminal
Action-The defendant and others were accused
of conspiring to defraud the state through the
acquisition and subsequent sale to the state of
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land which they had been informed the State
Roads Commission was about to acquire. On
the same day that the judge hearing the criminal
action adjourned the trial for a weekend recess,
another judge of the same court and his wife,
who had sold land to those accused in the
criminal case, brought a civil suit against the
defendant in which the judge and his wife
made allegations of facts substantially similar
to those involved in the criminal action. Although the judge attempted to prevent the
civil suit from becoming public knowledge,
it received much publicity through the media
of radio, television and the newspapers. The
accounts of the allegations in the judge's
complaint were fair, but they identified the
defendant in the civil suit as the same defendant in the road fraud conspiracy case,
which also had been given much publicity.
When the court trying the criminal case reconvened, the defendant filed a motion for a
mistrial based upon the publicity which had
been given to the civil suit. The trial judge
overruled the motion and the defendant was
convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed, holding that the defendant
had been deprived of his right to a fair trial
in the criminal action because of the publicity
given to the civil action involving substantially
the same issues. Basiliko v. State, 129 A.2d
375 (Md. App. 1957).
The state's contention that the publicity
relating to the civil suit was not harmful to
the defendant, because it added nothing to
what was brought out by the testimony in
the criminal case, was rejected by the court.
The court stated that the publicity "could have
left no doubt in anyone's mind that the well
known, highly respected, competent and experienced judicial officer who was one of the
plaintiffs in the civil suit believed Basiliko
guilty of conduct of the very kind with which
he was charged in the criminal case. It
amounted almost to a finding by him on the
very questions on which the jury would have
to pass in determining whether Basiliko was
guilty." Although it was not shown that any
individual juror actually read or heard any of
the publicity given the civil suit, the court
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indicated that, because of the widespread
and intensive coverage given the civil suit,
the inference that some jurors were in fact
reached by the publicity was too reasonable
and too strong to disregard. In addition, the
court said that questioning the jury in the
midst of the trial as to whether they were
aware of the civil suit, would have only served
to emphasize the information. The court also
stated that a special instruction by the trial
judge would have had the same effect. Furthermore, it was said, questioning the jury after
the verdict would have been fruitless, for an
admission by a juror that publicity concerning
the civil suit influenced him would be an admission that he considered evidence other than
that adduced at the trial.
Federal Auto Theft Act Includes Embezzled
Vehicles-The defendant arranged to borrow
an automobile for the purpose of transporting
friends to their homes. Upon receiving the
auto, however, the defendant drove it to
another state and sold it, without the owner's
consent. Thereafter the defendant was arrested
and charged with violating the National Motor
Vehicle Theft Act, commonly known as the
Dyer Act, which prohibits the tran-portation
in interstate commerce of a motor vehicle by
one "knowing the same to have been stolen."
At the trial in a federal district court, the court
granted the defendant's motion to dismnis. the
indictment on the grounds that the word
"stolen" ab used in the Act referred only to
thefts which constitute common law larceny.
The defendant's act, the court said, was an
embezzlement rather than a common law
larceny and therefore not within the scope of
the Act. The prosecution then appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. That Court,
with three members dissenting, reversed,
holding that the Act "includes all felonious
takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of
ownership, regardless of whether or not the
theft constitutes common law larceny." United
States v. Turley, 77 Sup. Ct. 397 (1957).
The majority of the count acknowledged the
general rule that where a .-Iatute uses a term
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which has an established common law meaning
and does not otherwibe define it. the common
law meaning will prewgil, but the court found
that "stolen" has no well accepted common
law meaning. Therefore, it was said, the word
must be defined within the context oi the Act.
Examining the legi;lative history of thL Act,
the Court noted that Congress had used
"stolen" synonomously with "theft," which,
it was said, has a broader meaning than common
law larceny. Moreover, the Court concluded,
"professional thieves resort to innumerable
forms of theft and Congress presumably sought
to meet the need for federal action effectively
rather than to leave loopholes for wholesale
evasion."
The dissent argued that the word "stolen"
should, in the absence of other statutory definition, be given its everday meaning. "It would
hardly be used," it was said, "even loosely, by
the man in the street to cover 'cheating.'"
Military Court May Not Consider Voluntariness in Assessing Weight to be Given Confession-The defendant was charged with
larceny in violation of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. At the trial in a military
court, the prosecution sought to introduce in
evidence the defendant's alleged confession.
The defendant objected, contending that the
confession was obtained while he was under
the influence of narcotics and was therefore
involuntary. The law officer ruled the confession adnissitle. At the conclusion of the
evidence. he instructed the .court that "the
voluntariness of the statements before you
here constitutes a matter you should consider
in determining what weight, if any, you are
to give to those statements." On appeal from
tLhe defendant's conviction, the United States
Court of Military Appeals ruled the instruction
erroneous, holding that a militaiy tribunal
may not consider the volunt*riness of a confession as a factor in determining its weight.
United States v. Jones, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 623, 23
C.M.R. 87 (1957).
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
court held, restates the view of a majority of
federal courts and recognizes a distinction

between voluntariness and truthfulness. "While
it is true," the court said, "that an involuntary
confession may be untrustworthy 'and hence
unworthy of belief, it is also true that a confession may be absolutely truthful yet inadmissible because of involuntariness." The
initial determination of admissibility, the.court
noted, is a questioh to be determined solely
by the law officer or judge. However, it was
said, where the evidence relating to voluntariness is in conflict, the jury or military
court may re-examine the issue of voluntariness
and "reject a confession in "toto if it disagrees
with the judge's original admissibility determination." But, it was said, the jury or
tribunal may not consider the weight and
credibility of the statement unless they first
find it voluntary. "Where voluntariness is in
issue," the court concluded, "it must be decided
by the court members unfettered by any
simultaneous considerations of weight and
credibility."
For a discussion of the procedures- used in
both state and federal courts to determine the
voluntariness of a confession, see The Role of
Judge and Jury in Determining a Confession's
Voluntariness, 47 J. Calm. L., C. & P.S. 000
(1957).
Prosecution Must Reveal Identity of Informer-A government informer had arranged
to purchase narcotics 7rom the defendant and a
micting in the informer's automobile was
arranged to complete the transaction. Prior
to the transfer, federal narcotics agents secreted themselves about the area and observed
the defendant carry a package to the car.
One agent, who had hidden in the trunk of the
informer's car where he overheard the parties'
conversation during the sale. After examining
the powder received by the informer from the
defendant, the latter was arrested and charged
with the unlawful sale and transportation of
narcotios. Confronted by the defendant at
police headquarters, the informer denied having
seen or known the defendant prior to the narcotics sale. At the trial in a federal district
court, the defendant unsuccessfully requested
the court to order the prosecution to reveal
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the identity of the informer. The trial court
denied the request, accepting the prosecution's
contention that the informer's activity in
other cases required the non-disclosure of his
identity. During the trial, the prosecution
offered the testimony of the agent who had
been in the trunk of the informer's car about
the parties' conversation during the sale. The
informer did not testify. Following his conviction and its affirmance by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
defendant petitioned for and was granted
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court.
That Court, with one member dissenting,
reversed the defendant's conviction, holding
that, under the circumstances of the case, the
trial court should have required disclosure of
the informer's identity. Roviaro v. United
States, 77 Sup. Ct. 623 (1957).
The informer's privilege, the majority noted,
which permits the prosecution to withhold an
informer's identity from disclosure, is designed
to encourage citizens to reveal law violations by
insuring their anonymity. However, the Court
said, the privilege is subject to several limitations. For example, it does not apply where
the informer's identity, is known to those
harmed by his information. In addition, the
Court held, "where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his
communication, is relevant and helpful to
the defense of an accused, or is essential to a
fair determination of a cause, the privilege
must give way." The Court indicated, however, that "no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable." Whether disclosure is
required, the majority said, depends upon
"the particular circumstances of each case,
taking into consideration the crime charged,
the possible defenses, the possible significance
of the informer's testimony, and other relevant
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factors." In the present case, it was said, the
defendant and the informer were the only
parties to the transaction and the informer was
the only person who could amplify or contradict
the prosecution's witnesses. The informer's
testimony, the Court said, might have disclosed
entrapment or have cast doubt upon elements
of the prosecution's case. Moreover, it was
said, the informer's denial of having known
the defendant indicated that the latter did
not know the informer's identity.
Mr. Justice Clark, dissenting, argued that
the defendant had failed to establish "a single
substantial ground essential to his defense
which Would make it necessary for the Government to name the informer." In addition, the
dissent said, evidence established that the
defendant had dealt with the informer on
several occasions and therefore probably
knew his identity. The nature of narcotics
traffic, it was said, requires the use of informers.
The majority's decision, the dissent concluded,
will increase the difficulties attendant upon the
apprehension of addicts.
In another recent case, a California appellate
court, with one member dissenting, affirmed
the prosecution's refusal to reveal an informer's
identity. People v. Alaniz, 309 P.2d 71 (Cal.
Dis. Ct. of App. 1957). In that case, police
officers arrested the defendant without a
warrant on the basis of information furnished
by an unidentified informer. A concurring
opinion distinguished the Roviaro decision on
the grounds that in that case the informer
was a witness to the transaction complained of,
while in the Alaniz case the informer merely
furnished information.
(For other recent case abstractssee "Police Science
Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 234-239.)

